Aggregation of Coarse Preferences

We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n alternatives. An individual preference is of refinement lindividual preferences; voting rules; aggregation

Ordering Pareto-Optima Through Majority Voting

A commodity is shared between some individuals; some selection procedure is used to choose allocations. In order to reflect that laws and rules rather than allocations are implemented and that they involve an element of randomness because of incomplete information, selection procedures are taken to be probability measures over the set of allocations. Illustrations and interpretations of the selection procedures are given.Pareto-optimal allocations; infra-majority voting

An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method

For a convex technology C we characterize cost sharing games where the Nash equilibrium demands maximize total surplus. Budget balance is possible if and only if C is polynomial of degree n−1n−1 or less. For general C, the residual* cost shares are balanced if at least one demand is null, a characteristic property. If the cost function is totally monotone, a null demand receives cash and total payments may exceed actual cost. The ratio of excess payment to efficient surplus is at most View the MathML sourcemin{2logn,1}. For power cost functions, C(a)=apC(a)=ap, p>1p>1, the ratio of budget imbalance to efficient surplus vanishes as View the MathML source1np−1. For analytic cost functions, the ratio converges to zero exponentially along a given sequence of users. All asymptotic properties are lost if the cost function is not smooth

The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing

Price of anarchy, Cost sharing, Average cost, Serial cost, Incremental cost, C60, C72, D60,